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Generation II Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) have a design weakness as shown by the 
Fukushima accident. Therefore, Generation III+ NPPs are developed with focus on 
improvements of fuel technology and thermal efficiency, standardized design, and 
the use of passive safety system. One type of Generation III+ NPP is the AP1000 
that is a pressurized water reactor (PWR) type that has received the final design 
acceptance from US-NRC and is already under construction at several sites in China 
as of 2015. The aim of this study is to investigate the behavior and performance of 
the passive safety system in the AP1000 and to verify the safety margin during the 
direct vessel injection (DVI) line break as selected event. This event was simulated 
using RELAP5/SCDAP/Mod3.4 as a best-estimate code developed for transient 
simulation of light water reactors during postulated accidents. This event is also 
described in the AP1000 design control document as one of several postulated 
accidents simulated using the NOTRUMP code. The results obtained from RELAP5 
calculation was then compared with the results of simulations using the NOTRUMP 
code. The results show relatively good agreements in terms of time sequences and 
characteristics of some injected flow from the passive safety system. The simulation 
results show that the break of one of the two available DVI lines can be mitigated 
by the injected coolant flowing, which is operated effectively by gravity and density 
difference in the cooling system and does not lead to core uncovery. Despite the 
substantial effort to obtain an apropriate AP1000 model due to lack of detailed 
geometrical data, the present model can be used as a platform model for other 
initiating event considered in the AP1000 accident analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The pressurized water reactor (PWR) is the 
most commonly constructed type of nuclear power 
plant (NPP) in the world. From a total of 435 plants 
in the world, 270 of them (61%) are PWRs, 
contributing 67% of world‟s nuclear electricity 
output [1]. All operating PWRs are from Generation 
II that were built no later than 1990s; part of their 
general specification is their dependency on active 
components and systems. In terms of safety, the 
availability of safety systems in Generation II  
plants is dependent on external AC power supply.                      
                                                 

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The plants' vulnerability has been shown in the 
Fukushima incident in 2011; while the accident 
occurred with boiling water reactors (BWRs), 
PWRs share the same vulnerability. NPP designers 
already realized this design weakness before the 
Fukushima accident and have already introduced the 
Generation III NPP that is focused on improvement 
of fuel technology, improvement of thermal 
efficiency, standardized design, and the use of 
passive safety system. 
Currently, there are two types of Generation 
III PWR, namely the Advanced PWR (APWR) 
developed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and 
planned to be constructed in the Tsuruga site of 
Japan, and the ATMEA1 by AREVA and 
Mitsubishi. A further development of Generation III 
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are the Generation III+ designs, which                        
include improvements in safety and economical 
aspect, and of which currently there are                           
five types available, namely AP1000,                      
European Pressurized Reactor (EPR), APR-1400, 
US-APWR, and VVER-1200. The Advanced                 
PWR 1000 (AP1000) from Westinghouse                     
Electric Company had received the final                      
design approval from US-NRC in 2005 [2]                          
and has become one of the best choices for                        
the next generation of nuclear power plants                             
to be constructed in China [3]. A contract                         
has also been signed to build four                      
South Korean APR-1400 units in the United                 
Arab Emirates [4]. 
From the various types of Generation                    
III+ NPPs, this study has selected the AP1000                   
as the advanced PWR based on two reasons.                      
First, after the Fukushima accident, the research              
on passive dependent safety features has                           
been significantly increased as one of the                    
solutions against the weakness of Generation                     
II reactors. Second, the AP1000 design is based                  
on proven design and is already under construction 
process in China. Those two considerations                      
are advantageous when the Indonesian Government 
Regulation No. 2 / 2014 concerning Nuclear 
Installation Licensing and Nuclear Material 
Utilization is considered. The regulation                     
requires that the future NPP in Indonesia                        
should be selected based on proven technology                    
for all its structures, systems, and components 
important for safety. The aim of this study                          
is to investigate the behavior and performance                     
of the passive safety system in the AP1000                        
and to verify the safety margin during the direct 
vessel injection (DVI) line break as the selected 
event. This event was also selected due                               
to the importance of the DVI line for discharging 
the injected flow directly into the pressure                     
vessel; thus, its breakage will result in a                         
great challenge to the passive safety system                     
and is determined as the greatest contribution                     
to the core damage frequency [5]. This event                   
was simulated using RELAP5/SCDAP/Mod3.4 as a 
best-estimate code developed for transient 
simulation of light water reactor during a postulated 
accident. This event is also described                           
in the AP1000 design control documents,                     
Chapter 15: Accident Analyses, issued by 
Westinghouse, as one of several postulated 
accidents simulated using different best-estimate 
codes [6]. In that document, the DVI line                      
break event was simulated using the NOTRUMP 
computer code. The verification of the results will 
be performed by comparing the RELAP5 simulation 
with the NOTRUMP for several thermal hydraulics 
parameters. Similar research has been done by                  
Xue-Dong Qiao et al. regarding the DVI line                     
break simulation using RELAP5 [7]. Several                    
key parameters have been also compared with the 
results from using the NOTRUMP code.                      
The differences between the aforementioned                
study and this one are that here more                          
thermal hydraulic parameters have been retrieved 
and compared, such as core mixture water level               
and core cladding temperature, to show more                   
deeply the performance of the AP1000                     
passive safety system, to ensure the safety                      
of the AP1000. 
 
THEORY 
AP1000 passive safety systems 
 
The AP1000 passive safety system consists of 
the passive core cooling system (PXS) and the 
passive containment cooling system (PCS).                     
The PXS is then subdivided into the passive              
residual heat removal system (PRHRS), the                  
passive safety injection system (PSIS), and                   
the automatic depressurization system (ADS)                     
to provide core decay heat removal, safety injection 
for core cooling, and reactor coolant system                
(RCS) depressurization [8]. The combination                     
of all the three systems will protect the AP1000 
reactor against leakages and ruptures of various 
sizes and in various locations. This study                     
only focuses on the function of the PXS rather                      
than the PCS due to the PCS‟s role in the long-                
term cooling process after an accident.                             
The description of PXS subsystem and associated 
components are as follows: 
 
 
Passive residual heat removal system (PRHRS) 
 
The main component of the PRHRS                         
is the passive residual heat removal heat                        
exchanger (PRHR-HX) that is designed to                     
operate without active components but                          
instead depend on passive components and 
processes such as gravity effects and                              
natural circulation [9]. The PRHR-HX features                   
a C-shaped tube bundle as a component                          
for transferring the core decay heat and is                      
immersed inside the in-containment refueling                
water storage tank (IRWST) as heat sink                          
(see Fig. 1). The function of the PRHRS is 
specifically needed for certain postulated accidents 
where the cooling process via the steam generators 
is unavailable.  
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Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of passive residual heat removal 
system (PRHRS) [5]. 
 
 
Passive safety injection system (PSIS) 
 
The main component of the PSIS are two core 
makeup tanks, two accumulators, one IRWST, and 
one containment sump, as shown in Fig. 2. The core 
makeup tank (CMT) systems will provide a 
relatively high flowrate of borated water for a longer 
time at any pressure. The accumulators provide a 
higher flowrate of borated water for a short time 
when the RCS pressure falls under 4.83 MPa, 
allowing the nitrogen pressure inside the 
accumulator to push the accumulator's content out. 
The IRWST will provide a low flowrate of borated 
water for a longer time when the RCS pressure 
decreases to nearly the containment pressure or the 
pressure of the tank. The containment sump will 
recirculate the borated water from the above three 
sources to the RCS for a continuing core cooling 
process. All PSIS functions work via a direct vessel 
injection line to reach the core inside. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of passive safety injection system 
(PSIS) showing one of the two lines [8]. 
 
Automatic depressurization system (ADS) 
 
The ADS consists of two trains of four stages 
of valves, as shown in Fig. 3. It is actually a part of 
the RCS, where the first three stages of valves are 
connected to the pressurizer steam space to 
discharge the steam to the water inside the IRWST 
through spargers. The fluid (steam or two-phase 
mixture) from the fourth-stage valves that are 
connected to the two hot legs is vented directly to 
the contaiment atmosphere. Those ADS valves open 
in sequence based on the CMT water level to 
provide a controlled depressurization of the RCS, 
specifically during a small-break LOCA in order to 
achive an RCS pressure condition for injection from 
accumulator and IRWST.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Simplified schematic diagram of automatic depressu-
rization system (ADS) [8]. 
 
 
DVI line break accident 
 
A DVI line break is defined as a double-
ended rupture of the pipe close to the DVI nozzle 
(see Fig. 2), meaning that effectively two breaks 
should be modeled. From two DVI nozzles, only 
one break line is assumed to be analyzed [6].                
The two breaks cause two sources of coolant 
discharge to be considered. One source in the vessel 
side will lead to reactor depressurization, and the 
other source to actuation of broken line accumulator 
and CMT to discharge coolant into the containment. 
Therefore, only one out of the two PSISes will have 
a role to respond the break sequences. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In this study, the primary, secondary, and 
passive safety systems of AP1000 were modeled 
first. A steady-state calculation was performed in 
order to obtain the steady-state operation condition. 
After that, the DVI line break simulation was 
conducted and the reactor system behavior during 
the event was analyzed; the behavior includes, 
among others, reactor coolant system (RCS) 
depressurization, inventory depletion, and inventory 
refilling via safety injection. The results of analysis 
from the AP1000 design control documents were 
used as comparison with the results obtained during 
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the analysis in this study. From that comparison, the 
accuracy of the AP1000 model developed for this 
simulation can also be analyzed, and the results               
are useful as a tool to verify the results from                 
other analyses. 
 
 
RELAP5 model for AP1000 
 
In order to simulate the event, a model of the 
AP1000 should be developed. The development of 
an AP1000 model using RELAP5 was carried out in 
several stages, starting with the model of primary 
loop, followed by partial secondary loop, and finally 
by each part of the passive safety system. During 
each model's development, a verification and 
validation process was performed, resulting in 
several improvements and modifications. The model 
of primary and secondary loops has been described 
in reference [10] and has been continuously 
modified since then. In general, the primary loop 
consists of one hot leg, two cold legs, one steam 
generator, one pressurizer, and two canned motor 
pumps. The secondary loop is modeled as a 
downcomer connected to the main feedwater source; 
the downcomer carries the water to be boiled inside 
the boiling region. The resulting vapor-water is 
separated using the separator model, and the end dry 
steam is directed into a steam dome and one control 
volume representing the turbine region. As a part of 
the primary loop, the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) 
is modeled as a circuit of hydraulic components, 
such as downcomer, bottom head, lower plenum, 
core active region, core bypass, upper plenum, and 
upper head, to show the coolant flow direction.              
The core active region is subdivided into two flow 
channels representing the hot and average channel 
inside the fuel with different radial heat fluxes and 
channel flow. Each core channel is composed of 
nine axial segments corresponding to the number of 
spacer grids of fuel assembly. 
The modeling of PXS, consisting of PRHRS, 
CMT, and IRWST, and containment system with its 
cooling system (PCS), has been carried out step by 
step as described in the references [11-13].               
E. B. Shi et al. described the utilization of those 
PXS components to anticipate the station blackout 
event in an AP1000 [14]. Figure 4 shows the                
most recent model of the AP1000 prepared for               
this particular event analysis, written in the 
RELAP5 input deck. The model of the PRHR-HX is 
similar to the model of steam generator in the 
primary tubes side, where hundreds of heat               
ransfer tubes are lumped into a single component 
with a similar calculated heat transfer area.                   
Those tubes are connected to the IRWST                    
model using a heat structure model to enable                    
the heat transfer from the primary side                           
into the IRWST pool water  model. The IRWST 
pool water is modeled as several vertical 
hydrodynamic volumes with  an air space in                
the top connected into the containment model.                  
To model the PSIS, a loop model consisting                         
of the CMT, the accumulator, and the DVI  line is 
developed. The CMT tank is modeled  as several                          
vertical hydrodynamic volumes  with an outlet valve 
as a trip valve in the bottom of CMT injection                     
line. The accumulator is added at the last step                      
of the development process as a lumped                   
component containing nitrogen gas with a                 
pressure of 4.83 MPa. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. AP1000 nodalization using RELAP5 for accident analysis and the DVI break location (X). 
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The DVI line break event requires the 
actuation of the ADS; therefore, the first three 
stages of the ADS are modeled by three parallel 
pipes connected to the pressurizer's upper head. 
Each flow path has one motor valve with a flow area 
similar to two valves controlled by open and close 
trip in the input deck. The two stage-four ADSes are 
modeled as two trip valves connected to the two hot 
legs respectively. The functionality of the ADS 
model has been verified and described in [15]                
and [16]. 
 
 
Modelling of the DVI line break 
 
The DVI line break occurs in one of two DVI 
lines connecting the pressure vessel. The exact 
location is in the inlet nozzle directing the injected 
coolant into the downcomer (The “X” sign in                 
Fig. 4). To simulate the break, a 6.81-inch DVI line 
break, which represents a double-ended break,                   
is added to the input deck by adding two trip              
valves with their associated flow areas and               
a time-dependent volume as the discharge volume. 
 
Table 1. PMS setpoints and time delay used in the DVI line 
break analysis 
 
Function Setpoint assumed in 
the event 
Time 
delays (sec) 
 
Reactor trip on low 
pressurizer pressure 
 
12.41 MPa 
 
2.0 
“S” signal on low-low 
pressurizer pressure 
11.72 MPa 2.0 
SG feedwater control 
valves starts to close 
After „„S‟‟ signal 2.0 
Main steam isolation 
valves start to close 
After reactor trip 
signal 
6.0 
Reactor coolant 
pumps trip 
After „„S‟‟ signal 6.0 
PRHRS isolation 
valve starts to open 
After „„S‟‟ signal 62.0 
CMT injection starts After „„S‟‟ signal 2.0 
ACC injection starts 
on low RCS pressure 
4.83 MPa 0.0 
ADS-1 control valve 
trip signal 
67.5% liquid 
volume fraction in 
CMT 
20.0 
ADS-2 control valve 
trip signal 
70 s after ADS-1 
actuation 
0.0 
ADS-3 control valve 
trip signal 
120 s after ADS-2 
actuation 
0.0 
ADS-4A starts to open 120 s after ADS-3 
actuation 
0.0 
ADS-4B starts to open 60 s after ADS-4A 
actuation 
0.0 
IRWST isolation 
valve starts to open 
120 s after ADS-3 
actuation 
0.0 
 
A double-ended break requires a model of                      
break discharge from two directions, namely the 
DVI side and the downcomer side, as modeled by 
those two trip valves. Each downward-oriented trip 
valve employs models of the counter-current flow 
limitation (CCFL), choked flow, and abrupt area 
change. After the break occurs, the AP1000 
Protection and Monitoring System (PMS) detects 
any anomaly and change of the reactor parameters 
and send the related signal to actuate the reactor 
protection system and safety system related to the 
event. Table 1 lists the PMS setpoints and time 
delay assumptions used in the DVI line-                    
break LOCA as summarized from the AP1000 
design control document of Chapter 15: Accident 
Analyses [6]. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Steady-state simulation 
 
Before the break is simulated, a steady-state 
condition should be achieved, representing                     
the initial conditions of the plant. The duration                      
of simulation needed to achieve that condition              
varies depending on the needed accuracy                         
of parameters. Some parameters needed to achieve 
the steady-state condition, obtained as a result of 
1000 s of simulation, are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Steady-state calculated results of AP1000 
 
Reactor Parameters RELAP5 Rated value 
 
Core thermal power (MWt) 
 
3468.00  
(102%) 
 
3400.00  
(100%) 
Vessel inlet / outlet temperature 
(ºC) 
292.13 /  
327.00 
280.67 /  
323.33 
RCS pressure (MPa) 15.69 15.45 
Hot / cold leg mass flow 
(kg/sec) 
8539.12 /  
4269.36 
8743.2 /  
4397.3 
Hot / cold leg coolant flow 
(m3/hours) 
46529.35/ 
20674.72 
44458.21/ 
21566.26 
Total steam flow (2 steam 
generators) (kg/sec) 
1929.34 1887.44 
Steam generator pressure (MPa) 6.06 5.76 
Steam generator feed water 
temperature (ºC) 
226.67 226.67 
Feed water mass flow (kg/sec) 965.00 943.72 
Transferred heat from RCS to 
secondary side (core power plus 
RCP heat) (MWt) 
3484.66 3415.0 
Pressurizer water level (m) 6.61 6.53 
 
The rated values are the design parameters obtained 
from the Chapter 5: Reactor Coolant System and 
Connected Systems from the AP1000 design control 
document [6]. Table 2 shows the comparison 
between the steady-state calculated values from 
RELAP5 code and the rated values for the AP1000 
plant. The difference in the core thermal power of 
RELAP5 arises from increased thermal power to               
2% above the rated value as required by the accident 
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conditions. Those increased thermal power leads to 
the increases of several parameters, such as 
feedwater and steam mass flows, due to increased 
heat transferred from the RCS. For other 
parameters, there is a good agreement between the 
calculated values and the rated values. After 1000 s 
of steady-state simulation, a simulation of a double-
ended break in the DVI-A line (see Fig. 4) with a 
6.81 inch diameter is conducted by opening two trip 
valves, each connected to the DVI line A and the 
dedicated downcomer. 
 
 
Transient simulation 
 
The break is initiated by opening the break 
trip valve instantaneously at 0 seconds (after 1000 
seconds is simulated in a steady-state simulation).  
In Fig. 4, the break trip valve is located in the DVI-
A line. In this case, there are two break sources, 
namely the broken DVI line and another source in 
the downcomer. From the DVI line side, the break 
will directly initiate an accumulator discharge via 
the DVI line to the containment. From the 
downcomer side, a subcooled discharge causes a 
rapid RCS depressurization until the pressure 
setpoint for reactor trip is reached. A reactor trip 
signal is generated, which initiates a shutdown 
process. That signal will also initiate a mechanism 
to isolate the main steam line in all two steam 
generators. As the RCS depressurization continues, 
the pressure setpoint for the “Safeguard” signal is 
reached causing several actuation of reactor control 
system and PXS. The “S” signal will actuate the 
main feedwater valve to close, cutting the feedwater 
supply to both of the two steam generators. After a 
different time delay, the reactor cooling pumps are 
also tripped, causing a loss of forced convection in 
the RCS. In the PXS, the opening of the CMT 
isolation valves allows the CMT in the broken loop 
to discharge directly to the containment via the 
break trip valve. Because of that discharge flow, the 
level of CMT is formed and starts to fall until the 
ADS stage 1 setpoint, corresponding to 67.5% tank 
volume, is reached, which inititates an opening of 
ADS stage 1 valves. That event will discharge steam 
from the top of the pressurizer leading an increase 
of RCS depressurization rate. The ADS stage 2 
valves open 70 seconds after the opening of the 
ADS stage 1 valves. The opening of two first ADS 
stage valves accelerates the RCS depressurization, 
which affects the pressure in the intact DVI loop 
(DVI-B in Fig. 4). The intact loop accumulator 
starts to inject into the downcomer as the pressure 
falls below the accumulator pressure setting. The 
ADS stage 3 valves open 120 seconds after the 
opening of the ADS stage 2 valves followed by the 
ADS stage 4A and 4B valves to open after related 
time sequences. The IRWST injection line 
connected to the DVI loop is isolated by a valve, 
which initiates and opening, coincident with the 
ADS stage 3 valves open signal. An injection flow 
from the IRWST is not established as the RCS 
pressure is still above the IRWST pressure. In the 
broken DVI loop, once the DVI line pressure falls 
below the IRWST pressure, the water from the 
IRWST starts to discharge via the broken trip valve 
into the containment. In the intact DVI loop, the 
RCS depressurization continues after the opening of 
the ADS stage 4 valves, which allows an injection 
flow from the intact IRWST injection line                          
to take place.  
The event sequences described above for a 
duration of 3000 seconds are summarized in Table 3 
for the simulation results; there, it is compared with 
the results from NOTRUMP code of AP1000 
accident analysis document. The results listed in 
Table 3 show a relatively good agreement between 
RELAP5 and NOTRUMP code calculations.               
The differences on the event occurrence times are 
still within the range and acceptable due  to the 
complexity of the model and the assumptions made. 
In the RELAP5 model, many assumptions are made 
regarding the lengths and heights of the injection 
line and other lines in the DVI loops, due to the 
unavailability of data; the assumptions affect the 
accuracy of event occurrence times of natural 
circulation and gravity-injected flow. 
 
Table 3. Double-ended DVI line break sequence of events 
 
Events Time 
RELAP5 NOTRUMP 
Break at DVI-A nozzle opens 0.0 
(T=1000 
seconds) 
0.0 
Reactor trip signal (RCS 
pressure < 12,411 MPa) 
23.39 13.1 
“S” signal  (RCS pressure < 
11,72 MPa) 
29.13 18.5 
Main steam valves to close 29.39 19.1 
Main feedwater valves to close 31.13 20.6 
Reactor coolant pump trip 35.13 24.6 
ADS stage 1 valves open 201.73 182.5 
ADS stage 2 valves open 271.73 252.5 
Intact accumulator (DVI-B) 
injection starts 
299.00 254.0 
ADS stage 3 valves open 304.07 372.5 
ADS stage 4 valves open 513.71 492.5 
Intact accumulator (DVI-B) 
empties 
674.00 600.0 
Intact loop IRWST (DVI-B) 
injection starts 
850.00 1470.0 
Intact loop CMT (DVI-B) 
empties 
2103.50 2123.0 
 
The sequences after the break can also be 
identified as the typical phases of the small break 
LOCA involving the operation of the passive 
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engineered safety features. Those phases are the 
blowdown phase, the natural circulation phase, the 
ADS blowdown phase, and the IRWST injection 
phase [17]. The blowdown phase is characterized by 
the RCS depressurization up to a stable condition 
due to the loss of coolant mass. At the end of that 
phase, the water in the pressurizer is completely 
empty and replaced by the steam. The natural 
circulation phase is basically a core decay heat 
removal process by the steam generator's secondary 
side, PRHR-HX, and core makeup tank 
recirculation flow. The ADS blowdown phase is 
initiated by the opening of the first three stages of 
the ADS valves followed by the fourth stage ADS 
valves for a controlled depressurization of the RCS. 
In this phase, the RCS pressure is brought down to 
the actuation setting of the accumulator in the intact 
DVI line. The IRWST injection phase is the phase 
where the coolant from the IRWST starts to flow by 
gravity into the core via the DVI line. This can only 
be achieved when the RCS pressure is below the 
pressure in the top of the IRWST to initiate the long 
term core cooling. 
Figures 5 to 10 show the results of several 
RELAP5 transient simulations and their 
comparisons with the NOTRUMP simulation 
results. It is to be noted that the NOTRUMP figures 
are extracted manually from the AP1000 design 
control document of Chapter 15: Accident Analyses, 
so that the accuracy of the transient simulation 
might not be high [6]. The calculated RCS 
depressurization transient and the actuation of the 
reactor protection system and PXS are shown in      
Fig. 5. Once the DVI-A line break occurs, the RCS 
pressure drops rapidly from the initial operating 
pressure of 155 bar to the pressure setpoint of the 
trip reactor and the “S” signal. At the end of the 
simulation time, the RCS pressure is stable around 
1.3 bar. The pressure transients show a close 
similarity between the two codes. In the figure, the 
time event designation is referred to the RELAP5 
transient line.  
 
 
Fig. 5. RCS depressurization. 
The RCS depressurization is caused by loss of 
inventory from the DVI-A line break and the 
downcomer (vessel side). Figure 6 shows the break 
flow rate from the downcomer (vessel side) 
calculated by RELAP5 and NOTRUMP codes. In 
the beginning, the NOTRUMP flowrate appears 
higher that the RELAP5, which might be caused by 
the differences in the loss coefficient of the break 
model. At the start of DVI break, only liquid flow 
discharges from the downcomer occurs, to be 
followed by steam flow as the void fraction in the 
core increases [18], as shown by NOTRUMP 
calculation results. That phenomenon (differences in 
the liquid and vapor phase of break flow) can not be 
shown in the present RELAP5 model. The RELAP5 
calculation can only provide a combined liquid and 
vapor flow rate, where their distinct composition 
can be represented by the liquid or void fraction as 
indicated in the figure. The beginning of RELAP5 
vapor break is characterized by the 0.5 void fraction 
in the break junction, meaning that the vapor break 
(junction liquid fraction less than 1.0) had occurred 
at an earlier point. The break flow transient from the 
vessel side after initiation of the break is then 
mainly influenced by the flow injection of CMT, 
accumulator, and IRWST in the intact DVI line into 
the core. When the core is supplied by the IRWST 
coolant, the break is more likely a mixture of water-
vapor as the junction's liquid fraction changes 
rapidly from 1.0 to 0.0. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Downcomer break discharge flowrate. 
 
As previosly mentioned, the end of the 
blowdown phase is characterized by the occurrence 
of two-phase break flow and the emptying of the 
pressurizer, whose water is then replaced by steam. 
The emptiness of the pressurizer coincides with the 
CMT level decrease in the broken DVI line reaching 
the 67.5% level. This setpoint will actuate the 
opening of ADS stage 1, followed by stages 2 and 3 
sequentially. Those ADS actuations result in a 
decrease of pressure at the pressurizer steam space 
and cause the coolant in the upper plenum to flow 
into the pressurizer [19]. This event is shown as an 
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increase of the pressurizer's two-phase water level 
[20] until the actuation of the ADS stage 4 to drain 
the pressurizer water once more again. Figure 7 
shows that increase and decrease of coolant inside 
the pressurizer due to the actuation of ADS valves. 
The break occurrence in the DVI-A also 
directly initiates the coolant discharge from the 
accumulator as the line pressure suddenly drops 
below its nitrogen pressure. The flow is interrupted 
when the CMT isolation valve is opened to 
discharge coolant from the CMT as also shown               
in the increased break mass flow from broken                
DVI line. The aforementioned phenomena of 
accumulator and CMT flow are shown in Fig. 8 
together with NOTRUMP calculation result for the 
CMT injection flow only, since the accumulator 
injection data for NOTRUMP in the DVI-A is not 
provided. In the CMT of the intact DVI line, a flow 
developed as a recirculation flow due to the density 
difference in the cold leg and the coolant inside the 
CMT, as shown in Fig. 9. In the figure, the stopped 
CMT flow due to the backpressure caused by high 
accumulator flowrate for RELAP5 calculation is 
visible [20] although the duration of the stoppage as 
found by the RELAP5 calculation results is shorter 
than what is found by the NOTRUMP calculation. 
By comparing the flow transient of Fig. 8 and                 
Fig. 9, the break flow transient of Fig. 7 shows               
the influences of flow onset from accumulator                
and CMT. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Pressurizer water volume and ADS actuation flow rate. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. CMT injection flowrate in the broken DVI line. 
 
Fig. 9. CMT flowrate in the intact DVI line. 
 
The comparison simulation results for coolant 
flow from accumulator of intact DVI line is shown 
in Fig. 10. From the figure, the calculated mass 
flowrates are similar for the RELAP5 and 
NOTRUMP code. The results indicate that the 
assumptions on the piping geometry in the 
accumulator model using RELAP5 are in line with 
the NOTRUMP model.  
 
 
Fig. 10. Accumulator flowrate in the intact DVI line. 
 
By analyzing the results of RELAP5 and 
NOTRUMP calculations, differences were found in 
the estimates of the discharge mass flowrate of the 
break and injection mass flowrate from accumulator 
or CMT. Those were again mainly caused by the 
effect of piping loss coefficient due to the model 
assumptions of the lengths and heights of the 
injection line and other lines in the DVI loops. In a 
natural circulation flow, a different height will result 
a different driving head and a different length means 
a different piping resistance, and those will affect 
the resulting mass flowrate along the pipe in the 
form of flow instability [21]. 
The sequenced actuation of ADS valves 
reduces the RCS pressure to a value that is below 
the IRWST pressure since it is directly connected to 
the containment. The IRWST injection line is 
isolated from the DVI line by a valve that opens  
120 seconds after the actuation of ADS stage 3 or at 
the same time with the actuation of ADS stage 4 
valves. The RCS depressurization via the ADS stage                      
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4 valves has the biggest impact on the reduction of 
RCS pressure to a value below the IRWST pressure. 
The valve opening will not lead directly to the 
IRWST water flow by gravity since the pressure in 
the connecting pipe of DVI line is still higher due to 
the CMT injection flow in the broken DVI line and 
the RCS pressure in the intact DVI line. As shown 
in Fig. 11, the IRWST injection flow starts to occur 
as the CMT volume is empty in the broken DVI line 
(see Fig. 8) and almost at the same time RCS 
pressure drops below the IRWST pressure in the 
intact DVI line. Compared with the NOTRUMP 
calculation, the IRWST gravity flow in the intact 
DVI line of RELAP5 is established earlier but 
stabilizes at the same flowrate of approximately 65 
kg/s. The effect of loss coefficient and piping model 
in the IRWST injection line between the two codes 
might lead to the difference in the beginning                   
of injection. 
 
 
Fig. 11. IRWST injection flowrate in the broken and intact                 
DVI lines. 
 
The loss of RCS inventory due to the 
discharge from the break through the downcomer 
can be seen in the core mixture level as shown in 
Fig. 12. The core mixture level is caused by void 
formation under the two-phase mixture surface due 
to the boiling and flashing; in RELAP5, it is 
calculated by the equation below [22] 
 
      
          
    
  (1) 
 
Where Hcollapsed is the collapsed liquid level or the 
sum of all liquid fraction and αc is the average void 
fraction along the axial components of related 
height. The mixture level is measured from the 
lower plenum, through the core, up to the upper 
plenum above it, resulting in the overall height of 
8.46 meters. This result is close to the NOTRUMP 
calculation result of 8.84 meters in the normal 
(compressed) condition. Under the compressed 
condition, that mixture level is in reality a liquid 
(single) phase. By the same reference, the height of 
the active fuel is about 6.26 meters.  
 
Fig. 12. Transient of core mixture level and cladding 
temperature. 
 
Figure 12 shows the development of mixture 
level due to the loss of coolant inventory in the core 
region that, along the transient time, is still above 
the core height; thus, no core uncovery occurs.                
The core is cooled by the two-phase mixture [23]              
as proven by the cladding temperature reduction 
along the time. That result also conforms                        
with the NOTRUMP calculation. The core uncovery 
event also emphasizes that the event of the DVI                
line break is included in the small-break                     
LOCA category.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, a double-ended break of                 
DVI line in AP1000 was simulated and analyzed 
using RELAP5/SCDAP/Mod3.4. The results                   
were compared with that obtained by NOTRUMP 
code as described in the AP1000 accident                     
analysis document. By comparing the sequences               
of time, a relatively good agreement is                           
found between the results of the two codes.                     
From the comparison, it was also found                               
that the results on several characteristics of                     
injected flow from the passive safety system                      
are also similar, as are the response of each                         
passive component. The simulation results                         
show that the break of one of two available                     
DVI lines can be mitigated by the injected                      
coolant flowing, which is operated effectively                 
by gravity and by the density difference                             
in the cooling system and does not lead                                    
to core uncovery. Despite the substantial                              
effort to obtain an apropriate AP1000 model                     
due to lack of detailed geometrical data, the                   
present model can be used as a platform model for 
other initiating events considered in the AP1000 
accident analysis. 
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